travel. In most of the chapters, he compellingly examines the personal motives and actions of important personages-most notably Albert Ballin of Hapag, Bruce Ismay of White Star, American ªnancier John Pierpont Morgan, and President Theodore Roosevelt.
Unfortunately, Keeling omits a separate discussion of the migration process before embarkation in Western European port cities. Although other chapters allude to the involvement of certain companies before that stage, ranging from their agent networks to their coordination with government agencies, this omission is especially regrettable; it would have provided a better link to the literature about the motives behind emigration decisions and revealed more clearly the role that shipping companies played in them. Nonetheless, Keeling largely succeeds in presenting an accessible account of the migration business that will be useful not only to scholars of migration but also to specialists from such tangential ªelds as naval and U.S.-political history.
Florian In this interesting study, Wenkai He joins the small but growing list of scholars engaged in comparing trajectories of state development in Western Europe and East Asia. His speciªc goal in focusing on England, Japan, and China is to explain when and why a modern ªscal system appears-modern in this case referring to centralized state collection of indirect taxes that are leveraged for long-term ªnance. England around the time of the Glorious Revolution and Meiji-era Japan are the successes to be explained and late Qing China the contrasting failure. After rejecting several potential explanations involving the presence of industry, representative political institutions, or territorial size as an obstacle, He proposes a two-part argument to account for the variation observed in his three cases: In the ªrst part, he suggests that the creation of modern ªscal states was a consequence of crises in which governments made excessive use of short-term liabilities or issues of paper currency. Since not all such crises can be expected to give birth to modern state ªnance, He adds, in the second part of his argument, that only crises that occur in the presence of "appropriate socioeconomic circumstances" lead to this outcome (22). These circumstances can vary in form.
After an initial theoretical excursion, He brieºy discusses the United Kingdom before offering a much more substantial treatment of the Chinese and Japanese cases, for which he employs a much broader range of sources. The presentation of the argument is clear, but the conclusions are frustrating. The role of "appropriate socioeconomic circum-stances" turns out to be a vague theoretical category on behalf of which certain previously dismissed alternative explanations reappear in a new guise when needed. For example, He states, "The unique position of London in the English economy facilitated government attempts to centralize the collection of taxes" (53), attributing London's advantage to England's relatively small size compared to China's. Size, however, was dismissed earlier as a causal explanation. Similarly, territorial size may well have been one of the socioeconomic circumstances that permitted the extensive development of private ªnancial networks in Japan. In the case of China, He suggests that appropriate socioeconomic circumstances for reform were absent because internal violence and rebellion during the nineteenth century led to severe disruption of the private economy.
In the end, the most important lesson of this book may be to remind scholars of a simple fact that is frequently overlooked: Successful state building depends heavily on the stability of the private economy. In an era showing considerable renewed interest in the subject of state capacity, this point is well worth remembering. This accessible book will interest scholars from multiple academic disciplines, including history, sociology, economics, and political science. Prejudice is preconceived opinion, the tacit foundation on which other judgments and courses of action rest; it exists as socially shared, but implicit, common sense. Pandey's subject is this archive of the unsaid, expressed in the forms of affect and the habits of speech and behavior that authorize and sustain "othering" based on race (in the United States) and on caste (in India). He aims to account for the effects of prejudice understood in two senses-(1) "vernacular" forms, expressed in the stigmatization of particular categories of people, and (2) the "universalist" prejudice of post-Enlightenment modernity, expressed in terms of a rational human subject, which, although represented as unencumbered by speciªcities of gender, class, caste, or race, occupies a white, masculine positionality.
David Stasavage New York University
Pandey's book examines this dual character of prejudice as it has shaped both Dalits' (India's ex-Untouchables) and African Americans' twentieth-century histories. Both groups are obvious targets of vernacular prejudice; they are also subjected to universalist prejudice, both as it differentiates them from the unmarked modern self and as internalized. Vernacular prejudice is readily identiªable and often (but not always)
